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ARTICLES 
Putting the Supreme Court Back in Place: 
Ideology, Yes; Agenda, No 
The Supreme Court justice selection season is just around the corner. The 
current Court has six Justices beyond the Social Security retirement age (the 
oldest eighty-three);' has not seen a new face in nearly a decade (the longest 
period without turnover in one hundred eighty  year^);^ and has been the object of 
persistent press reports predicting multiple retirements in the near f ~ t u r e . ~  The 
rumors were so strong following the 2002 term that the editorial page suggestions 
for structural changes to make the judicial selection system "fairer" (come out the 
way I would like) appeared in bunches4 and the Roe v. wade5 interest groups 
began preparing expensive television campaigns, one side claiming nominees 
"must commit to upholding Roe," the other claiming the first was trying to 
"politicize the judiciary."6 Only because the rumors were not true was the country 
spared another round of what Professor Stephen Carter has labeled "The 
Confirmation Mess"' - no holds barred, rock 'em, sock 'em, hardball politics over the 
appointment and confirmation of a justice to sit on the nation's highest court. 
This essay is about the permanent damage to the Supreme Court and to the 
country that may occur if the current approach to judicial appointments 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. I owe debts of gratitude to Professors Daniel Farber of 
Minnesota and California and Bennett Gershman of Pace for their encouragement and critique and to Sarah 
Courtman, a third year student at Pace, who did spectacular research. Any errors in research, analysis, and 
judgment are, of course, mine. 
I. RONALD . ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUT~ONAL L W, at li (7th ed. 2003) (citing the Justices' birth years 
as Stevens (1920), Rehnquist (1924), O'Connor (1930), Ginsburg (1933), Scalia & Kennedy (1936), Breyer 
(19371, Souter (1939), Thomas (1948)). 
2. Id. at xlix-li. The last appointment, Justice Steven Breyer, was in 1994. Id. at li. 
3. See, e.g., Timothy M. Phelps & Tom Bmne, Supreme Court Seat Shufjle? Judges' Retirements Would 
Spark First Shift in Decades, NEWSDAY, May 18,2003, at A23. 
4. Judith Resnik, Editorial, Supermajority Rule, N.Y. T a r ~ s ,  June 11, 2003, at A31; Stephen Gillers, 
Editorial, Make a List, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2003, at A31; David A. Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Editorial, 
Judging by Where You Sit, N.Y. TIMES, June 1 I, 2003, at A3 I .  
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
6. Robin Toner & Neil A. Lewis, Lobbying Starts as Groups Foresee Vacancy on Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 
2003, 5 I, at I. 
7. STEVEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS (1994). 
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continues, and offers an approach to the nomination and confirmation of Supreme 
Court justices that will help put the Court back in its proper place - out of the eye 
of the elective political storm. 
The traditionally understood role of the Supreme Court as the nation's "neutral 
arbiter" -the least "political" of the three branches of government - is at greater 
risk today than at any time in our history. From the time of Chief Justice 
Marshall's decision in Marbury v.   ad is on,^ the Court has had an important and 
continuing place in determining the shape of the most powerful and freest nation 
on Earth. In his classic, The American Supreme ~ o u r t , ~  Professor Robert 
McCloskey explains the rise to political power of this non-democratic institution 
in a democratic society by focusing on how Americans of the late Eighteenth 
Century held simultaneously the "contradictory ideas" of popular sovereignty, 
which "suggests will," and fundamental law, which "suggests limit."'0 
For with their political hearts divided between the will of the people and the rule of 
law, Americans were naturally receptive to the development of institutions that 
reflected each of these values separately. The legislature with its power to initiate 
programs and policies, to respond to the expressed interest of the public, embodied 
the dochine of popular sovereignty. The courts, genedly supposed to be without will 
as Hamilton said, generally revered as impartial and independent, fell heir almost by 
default to the guardianship of the fundamental law. . . .[T]he devotion of Americans 
to both popular sovereignty and fundamental law insured public support for the 
institution that represented each of them.' ' 
This simultaneous reverence for majoritarian and non-majoritarian values has 
resulted in a Supreme Court that "blends orthodox judicial functions with 
policy-making functions in a complex mi~ ture . " '~  Its power comes from 
maintaining the mixture in "nice balance," while the limitations on that power 
come from "the fact that [the balance] must be maintained."I3 
It is in this place, which Professor McCloskey describes as "half judicial 
tribunal and half political preceptor,"'4 that the Court must exist if it is to 
continue to be a useful, "venerated in~titution"'~ in the continuing development 
of our constitutional, republican, democracy. The place is maintained by "the 
myth of an impartial, judicious tribunal whose duty it is to preserve our sense of 
8. 5 U.S. 137 (1 803). 
9. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (3d ed. 2000). 
10. Id. at 7. 
11. Id. at 7-8. 
12. Id. at 12. 
13. Id. 
14. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 9, at 14. 
15. Id. at 14. 
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continuity with the fundamental law."I6 In short, the Court has not one place, but 
two. They are interdependent. It can maintain the first place - "half judicial 
tribunal and half political preceptor" - only by maintaining the half and half 
balance. Maintaining the balance perpetuates the public perception of the second 
place, that of "impartial, judicious tribunal," not just another agenda driven 
political institution. 
The Court's dual-nature place, with its gap between reality and myth, has 
agitated academic commentators searching for consistency, predictability, and a 
rational theory of constitutional adjudication. The "good many gallons of ink 
[that had] been spilled"17 over the constitutional legitimacy and societal value of 
judicial review when Professor McCloskey wrote his book are a drop in the 
bucket compared to the barrels that have washed over the landscape of 
constitutional theory during the last half century. Professor Alexander Bickel's 
"counter-majoritarian diffi~ulty"'~ has become the "obsession of modern consti- 
tutional scho~arship."~~ It is not my purpose to add even an eye-dropper of ink to 
the debate amongst liberals, originalists, textualists, critical legal scholars, 
feminist scholars, interpretevists, non-interpretevists, neo-anythings, and any- 
other-here-ignored-school of constitutional interpretation. Whatever the "true" 
mode of constitutional interpretation and theoretically "proper" role for the 
Supreme Court, the half-century of fevered exposition has done little to diminish 
the force of Professor McCloskey's observation that the argument is "perilously 
near to irrelevance," the equivalent of arguing that "America was unwise to be 
the nation that it was."20 
It is the paradoxical position of "half tribunal, and half political preceptor," 
supported by the public perception of the Court as "impartial judicious tribunal," 
that will be at risk if the President and the Senators do not exercise the wisdom 
and political fortitude to resist using the Supreme Court appointment process as 
an elective political football. It will be no small task, requiring no small amount 
of forbearance. The easy political capital for the President and Senators is in 
political posturing to one side or another of the "culture wars," for which the 
Supreme Court has been the symbolic eye of the storm. The momentum from 
recent Presidential and Senatorial performances in attempting to fill lower federal 
court vacancies, unfortunately, is all in the wrong direction. Both political parties 
have adopted the current fashion of putting the judiciary into the center of 
electoral politics. It is time to stop. 
16. Id. at 12. 
17. Id. at 10. 
18. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 
16 (1962). 
19. See Bany Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian 
Dzficulry, Part Five, 1 1  2 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002). 
20. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 9, at 10. 
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11 "[SOMEBODY] SAVE . . . THIS HONORABLE  COURT!"^' 
Justice John Paul Stevens, lamenting the Court's venture into the 2000 
Presidential election, observed, "Although we may never know with complete 
certainty the identity of the winner of this year's Presidential election, the identity 
of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an 
impartial guardian of the rule of law."22 
The extent to which the Court's reputation as the nation's neutral arbiter 
suffered as a result of the decision in Bush v.  ore,^^ or any number of other 
decisions over the last half-century, is open to debate. Justice Stevens, however, 
is not the first to warn that the more the Court is viewed as political preceptor the 
more risk to the myth of neutral arbiter that supports the Court's authority. Justice 
Felix Frankfurter made the same point in another important voting case. 
Dissenting from the suggestion in Baker v. that the Court should intervene 
to consider the constitutionality of a state voting scheme, he urged the Court to 
stay away from what would be considered a political question: "The Court's 
authority - possessed of neither the purse nor the sword - ultimately rests on 
sustained public confidence in its moral sanction."25 
It is not only Supreme Court Justices who have claimed the Court has 
destroyed the "nice balance" to which Professor McCloskey attributed the 
Court's power. Commentators from the political left and the political right have, 
at one time or another, suggested that the Court's intrusion into policy-making 
has politicized the Court and put its position as a "venerated institution" at risk.26 
That their insights about the Court's excessive policy-making seem to flow when 
they do not like the Court's decisions, and ebb when they do, does not mean there 
is no real danger from the claim or perception that the Court is "political." 
Skepticism about the Court's role as our neutral arbiter has increased at least 
21. "God save the United States and this Honorable Court!" is the last line in the Marshal's call that opens 
each session of the Supreme Court of the United States: "Oyez, oyez, oyez! All persons having business before 
the honorable, the Supreme Court of the United States, are admonished to draw near and give attention, for the 
Court is now sitting. God save the United States and this Honorable Court!" 
22. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128-29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
23. Id. 
24. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
25. Id. at 267. There is some disagreement amongst constitutiorial law scholars about whether the public 
confidence in the Court comes from the legitimacy of its legal arguments or from the political popularity of its 
decisions, but whatever the basis for the opinion, the Court's authority depends upon public acceptance of its 
authority. 
26. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall accused Justice Rehnquist 
of inventing a novel and "radical" theory of stare decisis to produce the outcome in Payne. Id. at 845; see also 
Larry D. Kramer, Editorial, No Surprise, It's an Activist Court., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at A33; James J. 
Kilpatrick, Editorial, Now Liberals Are Hollering About Court's 'Activism. ' ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 22, 
1989, at 21A; Robert P. Hey, Judicial Activism Stance Draw Fire, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 19, 1990, 
at 8; Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival Of Warren Court Activism, 1996 
SUP. CT. REV. 67 (1996). 
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since the "activism" label was attached to the Warren Court in the 1960s. The 
Rehnquist Court, despite its many statements extolling the virtue of judicial 
reticence, has gained a reputation for judicial activism that rivals or surpasses that 
of the Warren The Warren Court earned its activist reputation attacking 
the educational and voting scheme pillars of segregation - Brown v. Board of 
 ducati ion^^ and Baker v. c a r p 9  - and by changing procedures in the criminal 
justice system that weakened "the peace forces against the criminal forces."30 
The current Court earned its activist reputation re-waging the Civil War issue of 
states' rights, restricting congressional power under the Commerce Clause and 
the Fourteenth Amendment - United States v. bpez3' and City of Boeme v. 
~ l o r e s , ~ ~  and by its "naked act of political in taking the 2000 presidential 
election out of the House of ~epresentatives.~~ In between, the Burger Court 
decided Roe v. Wade - the spark that lit the electoral politics bonfire of the last 
three decades. Whatever one thinks of the importance or the rectitude of the 
decisions and the Courts that wrote them, few believe that they have increased 
respect for the Court's role as neutral arbiter. In the world of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, "activism" is an eight-letter, dirty word. It may be, as some have 
suggested, a derogatory label without content,35 but it is one that Supreme Court 
majorities of every persuasion go out of their way to disavow - usually while 
doing something that risks being beyond what the public thinks is the Court's 
ken. The Bush v. Gore per curium opinion, as it took the election away from the 
Florida judiciary, legislature, and people, said: "None are more conscious of the 
27. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE JR., THE WARREN COURT ANDAMWCAN P o m c s  (2000); Kramer, supra note 27. 
28. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954) (education). 
29. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (voting). 
30. The characterization of the Warren Court's decisions in cases such as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963) (uial counsel requirement) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to a lawyer during 
interrogation) is that of then presidential candidate Richard M. Nixon. MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES 
I 1 (1 994). 
31. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (restricting Congressional power under the Commerce Clause to impose gun 
restriction on states). 
32. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (restricting Congressional power under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment to pass the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act which attempted to reverse Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of 
OR v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). Smith held that a state law of general applicability criminalizing peyote use, 
when applied to deny unemployment benefits to Native American Church members who lost their jobs because 
of such use, was constitutional and therefore survived plaintiff's free exercise challenge. 
33. The characterization is that of Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace: The Supreme Court Commits Suicide, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Dec. 25, 2000, at 18. 
34. The effect of the Court's reversal in Bush v. Gore, 53 1 U.S. 98 (2000), of the Florida Supreme Court 
decision to allow a manual recount of presidential ballots was to take the matter from the political arena - where 
the result almost certainly would have been the same. A Florida recount, no matter when finished and 
irrespective of the "winner," would have put the question of the identity of electors to the Florida legislature and 
any challenges of the Florida electors to the House of Representatives, both of which were controlled by the 
Republican Party. 
35. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an "Acrivisr" Court? The Commerce Clause Cases, 
73 U .  COLO. L. REV. 1275 (2002). 
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vital limits on judicial authority than are the members of this Court, and none 
stand more in admiration of the Constitution's design to leave the selection of the 
President to the people, through their legislatures, and to the political sphere."36 
Justice Douglas, finding a state's ban on the use of birth control devices by 
married couples unconstitutional (a problem we can safely assume was not on the 
minds of the framers of the Constitution) said in Griswold v. ~onnec t i cu t :~ '  "We 
do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of 
laws that touch . . . social  condition^."^^ 
There is no evidence to date that the opinions of the Warren, Burger, and 
Rehnquist Courts or the views of Justices and commentators about the Court's 
overreaching has reduced the public's confidence in the Court as neutral arbiter,39 
but the comments and actions of the main speakers in the public dialogue may 
change that. The Presidents, Senators, interest groups and the media have 
increasingly conducted and reported Supreme Court appointments as if they 
should be based on the same thing as election of a President or Senator - an 
issue-driven, political agenda.40 The politicization of Supreme Court appoint- 
ments has spread, with the President and the Senate, under the influence of 
interest groups and the glare of media, making an elective political issue of lower 
federal court vacancies. The coming Supreme Court vacancies will only 
exaggerate a trend that might well jeopardize the public's faith in the Court's 
"moral sanction." It has to stop if the Court's proper place is to be preserved. 
Avoiding unproductive political wars over Supreme Court appointments is 
hardly a new idea. Some of the suggestions, such as abandoning judicial life 
tenure4' or requiring Supreme Court Justices to be confirmed by a supermajor- 
 it^?^ have been structural. Others, such as closed confirmation hearings, not 
having nominees appear, and limiting interest group i n ~ o l v e m e n t , ~ ~  have focused 
on changing or managing the norms of the appointment process. None of these 
suggestions, unfortunately, address directly one of the primary reasons, if not the 
primary reason, for the political mess around Supreme Court appointments: 
36. Bush, 53 1 U.S. at 1 1 1 .  
37. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
38. Id. at 482. 
39. Gallup News Service, The Florida Recount Controversy from the Public's Perspective; 25 Insights (Dec. 
22,2000), at http://www.gallup.com/polVreleases/pr001222bii.asp. The poll found overall public confidence in 
the Supreme Court unchanged, but that the Bush v. Gore decision did hurt the confidence of a majority of Gore 
supporters. Id. 
40. See generally MICHAEL J .  GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS ch. 7 (2000); CARTER, supra 
note 7, at 5. 
41. Philip D. Oliver, Retire Life Tenure for Justices, WALL ST. J . ,  Sept. 18, 1987, $ 1 ,  at 14. see also Akhil 
Reed Amar & Steven G. Calabresi, Editorial, Term Limits for the High Court, WASH. POST, Aug. 9,2002, at A23; 
Jack N. Rakove, Judges: Conferring A Lifetime of Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,2001, 5 4, at 5. 
42. Resnik, supra note 4. 
43. GERHARDT, supra note 41, ch. 10 (containing an exhaustive discussion of the pros and cons of these and 
other suggestions). 
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ideology. While ideology has been the source of an academic industry labeled 
Constitutional Theory, that industry has focused on Supreme Court decision- 
making and rarely on the Supreme Court appointment process. Whether the lack 
of attention is because it is a given that ideology is the problem causing the 
"confirmation mess," it is assumed that ideology cannot be avoided in any event, 
or because the role of ideology is not acknowledged, few have openly argued that 
ideology should or should not have a role in the appointment process. Professor 
Ronald Rotunda is one of the few who have argued against a role for ideology in 
the Supreme Court appointment process.44 He contends that Senators should 
neither inquire about nor consider nominees' ideology, but rather, should inquire 
only whether they have "made any promises to the President or his aides, other 
than the faithful performance of their judicial duties."45 He rejects the suggestion 
that Senators "should use the [confirmation] hearing to learn about the nominee's 
philosophy of constitutional interpretati~n."~~ Acknowledging that ideology may 
influence Senatorial votes, he argues that recognizing that reality does not mean 
"Senators should consider [ideology], anymore than recognizing that sin exists 
means that we should aspire to it."47 Although he claims that history, tradition, 
and judicial ethics support his position, it is unclear whether he believes that 
senatorial abstention from inquiry will cause ideology (1) to not be any part of the 
process, (2) to be part of the process, but swept under the rug, or (3) to be part of 
the process, but a legitimate concern only for the President. 
I disagree with Rotunda's conclusion that history, tradition, and legal ethics 
suggest that Senators should not inquire about a nominee's ideology. Further, I 
believe he is wrong to believe that failing to inquire about ideology would 
achieve any of his article's three possible goals. But he is right to focus on 
ideology as a critical factor in the Supreme Court appointment process and right 
to look at history, tradition, and judicial ethics in assessing the proper attitude of 
the players in the process - the President, the Senators, and the nominees - 
towards ideology. Most importantly, I agree that ideology is the key to producing 
a less politicized process. Only I believe that it is attention to ideology, not an 
attempt to pretend it does not matter, that will help to de-politicize the Supreme 
Court appointment process. 
111. TAKING IDEOLOGY OUT OF THE PROCESS -
THE ONE IDEA SURE NOT TO WORK 
Professor Rotunda contends that the lesson from history, tradition, and ethics is 
that Senators should not use confirmation hearings to "learn about the nominee's 
44. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Role of Ideology in Confirming Federal Court Judges, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
127 (2001). 
45. Id.at 131. 
46. Id. at 130. 
47. Id. 
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philosophy of constitutional interpretati~n."~' In short, don't ask about ideology. 
Ideology, of course, can relate to many enterprises from religion to politics to 
worldview. In the context of federal judicial selection, Professor Michael 
Gerhardt has observed: Ideology is "a loaded concept that can . . . allude to . . . a 
general philosophy about governing (or judicial decision making) or a deeply 
entrenched mode of approaching political or moral questions (including issues of 
constitutional interpretati~n)."~~ It is this broad view of political, constitutional, 
legal philosophy that cannot and should not be removed from the Supreme Court 
appointment process. 
A. WHOSE HISTORY? WHAT LESSONS? 
Professor Rotunda bases his contention that history militates against senatorial 
inquiry into ideology by focusing on the first half of the twentieth century, 
echoing President Richard Nixon's view that the "traditional constitutional 
balance" is one in which the President dominates the Supreme Court appointment 
process and the Senate is passive. His selective choice to establish his historical 
imperative is neither unique nor rare. "Richard Nixon's petulance," according to 
Professor Jeffrey Tulis, "has become the core of our century's constitutional 
understanding of judicial app~intment ."~~ In a publicized letter to Senator Saxbe 
of Ohio defending his nomination of Judge G. Harrold Carswell, President Nixon 
said he had the right to nominate someone whose philosophy matched his own, 
that the Senate should not consider philosophy in confirmation, and that this right 
had "been freely accorded to my predecessors of both par tie^."^' 
Nixon was wrong and, as a result, so is the "core of our century's constitutional 
understanding." Since 1789, "close to one out of five"52 Supreme Court 
nominations have been rejected by the Senate. Whatever one thinks of Professor 
Henry Abraham's harsh judgment that President Nixon "must have known how 
48. Id. 
49. GERHARDT, supra note 4 1, at 254. 
50. Jeffrey K. Tulis, Constitutional Abdication: The Senate, rhe President, and Appointments to the Supreme 
Court, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1331, 1336 (1997). 
51. The full text of President Nixon's Mar. 31, 1970 letter to the Republican Senator whom he would later 
appoint Attorney-General can be found among the Public Papers of President Richard Nixon at http:// 
www.nixonlibrary.orgIResearch~Center/l970~pdf~files\1970~0099.pdf. Regarding the traditional balance in 
the nomination-confirmation process, President Nixon said (in part): 
What is centrally at issue in this nomination is the constitutional responsibility of the President to 
appoint members of the Court - and whether this responsibility can be frustrated by those who wish to 
substitute their own philosophy or their own subjective judgment for that of the one person entrusted 
by the Constitution with the power of appointment. The question arises whether I, as President of the 
United States, shall be accorded the same right of choice in naming Supreme Court Justices which has 
been freely accorded to my predecessors of both parties . . . if the Senate attempts to substitute its 
judgment as to who should be appointed, the traditional constitutional balance is in jeopardy. . . . 
52. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS 13 (4th ed. 1999). 
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wrong he was . . . his historical misstatement was a distinct disservice to country, 
Constitution, and the relevant history of Supreme Court appointments 
goes back at least to 1795. 
In President George Washington's second term, the Senate rejected his 
nomination of John Rutledge to be Chief Justice. A delegate to the Constitutional 
convention and former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,54 Rutledge's 
opposition to the Jay Treaty with Great Britain caused thirteen of the sixteen 
members of his own Federalist party to deny the first president and Father of His 
Country the Chief Justice of his choice.55 
During the nineteenth century, political party was the proxy for ideology. 
Almost all Supreme Court nominees belonged to the nominating President's 
party;56 and the Senate rejected a third of them.57 
In the first half of the twentieth century there was a relative decline of major 
political party influence on Supreme Court appointments. Every President, save 
Theodore Roosevelt and Calvin Coolidge, nominated members of the opposite 
party.58 Passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, providing for popular election 
of Senators, coincided roughly with the beginning of a period of Senatorial 
deference to Presidential Supreme Court nominations. President Woodrow 
Wilson's successful nomination of Louis D. Brandeis and President Herbert 
Hoover's unsuccessful nomination of Judge John J. Parker were the only 
twentieth century confirmation dust-ups until President Nixon's unsuccessful 
nominations of Judges Clement F. Haynesworth, Jr. and G. Harold Carswell. 
There is a paucity of historical material concerning the subject of Senatorial 
inquiry until the second half of the twentieth century because nominees did not 
appear before the Senate until John Marshall Harlan testified at his 1955 
confirmation hearing.59 It is fairly well established, however, that ideology 
played a part in the two hotly contested matters of the first half of the twentieth 
century. While there was bitter opposition to Louis Brandeis because he was a 
Jew, his reformist ideology was unpopular with the country's major economic 
interests. Similarly, Judge Parker's rejection may have been due as much to what 
were perceived as anti-union judicial opinions as to his observation that "the 
participation of the Negro in politics is a source of evil."60 
53. Id. 
54. In a telling commentary on the importance of the Supreme Court of the United States in the 18th century, 
Rutledge resigned his position as Associate Justice to take a seat on the South Carolina Supreme Court. 
GERHARDT, supra note 41, at 5 1 .  
55. Id. at 5 1-52. 
56. Id. at CH. 3. f i e  only exceptions were nominations by Presidents Tyler, Lincoln, and Harrison. Each one 
nominated a member of another party. 
57. Id. 
58. ABRAHAM, supra note 52, at 377. 
59. There were two atypical appearances before Harlan's - Harlan Fiske Stone after he had been confirmed 
and Felix Frankfurter who read a prepared statement. ROTUNDA, supra note 45, at 130. 
60. HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS 46-47 (1988). 
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For at least the last three decades, various Presidents and Senators have been 
overtly interested in and have asked questions about the "particular mind set" 
with which nominees would approach a legal problem. Senator Charles E. 
Schumer has recently characterized unarticulated senatorial consideration of 
ideology as a "not-so-dirty-little se~ret ."~ '  Dirty or not, it is hardly a secret. Three 
Republican Presidents have proudly made nominations that fit the political 
ideological profile for Supreme Court appointments adopted by the 1980 
Republic platform. Democratic Senators have been aggressive in their questions 
to those nominees about their approaches to legal problems, with mixed results. 
Robert Bork was forthcoming (creating the new English language verb, 
"~orked").~* Judge Antonin Scalia, by contrast, was a portrait in studied 
reticence during his Supreme Court confirmation hearing. 
Whatever is to be said about the history of Supreme Court nominations, it does 
not establish a tradition of Senatorial deference to a Presidential prerogative. The 
nineteenth century rejection of a third of the presidents' nominees has been 
repeated over the last thirty-five years. 
The most important history for understanding the current nature of the 
Supreme Court appointment process begins in 1968. Political issues of the day 
have probably influenced nominations and confirmations of Supreme Court 
Justices throughout history,63 but until 1968 the political disagreement took place 
within a relatively invisible nomination-confirmation process that did not 
publicly politicize the Court. Not even President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's 
1937 scheme to rescue the New Deal by packing the Supreme Court was an 
elective political issue. President Richard Nixon's 1968 "southern strategy" to 
wrest the solid South from the Democratic Party focused on the Court. Promising 
to nominate to the Supreme Court only "strict constructionists" who would not 
widen the effect of Brown and who would not further weaken "the peace forces 
against the criminal forces,"64 Nixon made the Court an express elective political 
issue. In 1980 the Republican Party made the selection of prospective Supreme 
Court justices "who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent 
61. ROTUNDA, supra note 45, at 130 (citing Senator Schumer's July 1, 2001 appearance on the NBC 
television broadcast of Meet the Press). 
62. The Oxford English Dictionary (http:lldictionary.oed.com) lists "borked" as "political slang" and offers 
the following examples: 1987 Los Angeles 7imes 20 Sept. 413, I think this time the local minorities are 'Borking' 
up the wrong tree. 1991 New Republic 9 Sept. 2112 'We're going to Bork him,' the National Organization for 
Women has promised. But if they succeed, liberals may discover that they have Borked themselves. 1993 N. E 
Times Bk. Rev. 23 May 1111 This powerful force . . . that now goes around 'Borking' politically incorrect 
nominees. 2001 Roll Call (Electronic ed.) 5 July, Democrats . . . have established a tradition of 'Borking' 
Republican nominees. 
63. For example, John Rutledge was defeated for his view of the Jay treaty; Nathaniel Clifford's 1857 
confirmation followed a debate over his pro-slavery views; and Roger Taney's first nomination was rejected 
because of his position on the national bank. ABRAHAM, supra note 52, at 29-30. 
64. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 3 1, at l I.  
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human life"65 a prominent part of their party platform. Understood to be a 
promise to choose nominees who opposed Roe v. Wade, Presidents Ronald 
Reagan, George Bush (the elder), and George Bush (the younger) ran on the 
platform and emphasized the selection of right-minded Supreme Court justices. 
Vice President Walter Mondale made Supreme Court appointments an issue in 
his unsuccessful 1984 presidential campaign.@ President William Clinton did not 
make the beliefs of potential nominees a political issue, but promised during the 
1992 campaign to make appointments in all areas that "looked like ~ m e r i c a " ~ ~  
and Supreme Court nominations from "officials with substantial experience and 
accomplishments in public 
Since 1968, thirteen nominations have been confirmed - two after fierce 
Senate battles - and six have been rejected or withdrawn. The Presidential 
initiatives putting Supreme Court appointments into the elective political process 
have contributed to the emergence of interest groups whose primary, if not sole, 
reason for existence is influencing federal judicial  selection^.^^ Opposition 
Senators have responded to Presidential "politicization" of Supreme Court 
nominations in kind. As recently as 2001, Senate Democrats gathered to consider 
a strategy for foiling the stated intentions of President George W. Bush to produce 
a judicial system designed to reach particular issue results." 
The shift of the judicial appointment process from a patronage-like part of the 
political process to an elective political issue has been exaggerated by a sea 
change in media attention. Beginning with President Reagan's 1987 Supreme 
Court nomination of Professor Robert Bork, and continuing through the current 
battles over President George W. Bush's nominations to the lower federal courts, 
the increasingly intrusive glare of the media has increased public perception of a 
"political" federal judiciary. It has become a vicious circle in which the increased 
public awareness increases the politicians' public posturing, which, by heighten- 
ing the conflict, increases the media attention. This treatment of each judicial 
nominee as "a Supreme Court justice in miniat~re,"~'  provides a preview of what 
we might expect when the next Supreme Court vacancies occur. It is not a pretty 
picture. 
The recent shenanigans over the nomination of Miguel Estrada to the D.C. 
65. The 1980 Judiciary Plank for the Republican Parry, 3 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 2030,2046 (1980). 
66. See, e.g., Myra MacPherson, Election '84 and the Last Hurrahs; Reagan and Mondale: Touching Chords 
of Two Americas, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1984, at B 1; Bernard Weinraub, Mondale, In Summation, Evokes DI: 
King 5 Goal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1984, at B 17. 
67. GERHARDT, sup" note 4 1, at 13 1. 
68. Id. at 228. President William Clinton's priorities and relationship with the Senate did not allow him to 
fulfill candidate Clinton's expectations for Supreme Court appointments. 
69. Roben Shogan, Background Paper, The Confirmation Wars: How Politicians, Interest Groups, and the 
Press Shape the Presidential Appointment Process, in OBSTACLE COURSE: THE REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE PRESIDENTIAL PPOINTMENT PROCESS 87,137 (1996). 
70. Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Readying for Judicial Fight, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,2001, at A19. 
7 1. Jeffrey Rosen, Obstruction of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. l I ,  2002, at 38. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals present a representative, if unappealing, example of the 
dysfunctional process. Pursuing his stated desire to shape the Court (and what 
many believe to be his unstated desire to pander to a far-right wing political 
base.72) the President selected a lawyer rumored to have strong views on current 
social issues, with no Bork-like trail of writings or judicial opinions to provide 
evidence of those views. When it became known that Estrada wrote position 
papers while at the Justice Department - papers of the kind provided to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Professor Bork during their 
confirmation hearings - Estrada's opponents in the Senate demanded the position 
papers be furnished. Estrada refused. Republican Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, who had been a vigorous proponent of 
searching inquiry when a Democrat was making judicial nominations, pushed the 
Republican President's nominee to the Senate floor precipitously.73 The Demo- 
cratic opponents of the nomination filibustered the process to a halt.74 The 
Democrats charged President Bush with trying to pack the Court with ideologues 
without giving the Senate an opportunity to examine the record.75 President Bush 
said the Democrats were shamefully denying a seat on the D.C. circuit to an 
 isp panic.^^ The interest groups pumped out e-mail messages to rally the troops.77 
The media covered the battle as if it were the warm-up for the then approaching 
war with Iraq. The Democrats continued to filibuster. The Estrada nomination 
was going nowhere and he eventually withdrew. The Republican Senate majority 
is trying to change Senate rules to prohibit filibusters on judicial  nomination^.^^ 
72. See Roland Watson, Bush Faces Tough Call in Selection of Supreme Court Judge, TIMES (LONDON), June 
16,2003, at 13; Neil A. Lewis & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Vacancy or Not, Bracing for Supreme Court Fight, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 20,2003, at A20. 
73. In response to President Clinton's appointment of Bill Lann Lee, a former NAACP attorney seen as 
dangerously liberal by Republican Senators, as assistant attorney general for civil rights, Senator Omn Hatch 
promised that Lee would be one of "the most congressionally scrutinized bureaucrats in history." Brian 
McGrory, Lee Named Acting Head of Rights Unit; President Retreats From Earlier Threat, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Dec. 16, 1997, at Al .  Though Hatch allowed individual Republicans to kill some of President Clinton's 
nominations using the home-state veto, he refused to give such deference in 2003 in an effort to move Bush's 
nominees through the Senate. Nick Anderson, The Nation; Battle Over Judiciary Enters New Phase; As 
Democrats Prepare to Fight Bush Choice, Other Nominees Move Toward Approval, L.A. TIMES, April 26,2003, 
at 16. In order to try to shepherd President Bush's court nominations through Hatch "abandoned the 
longstanding 'blue slip' tradition, which let a single senator block a home-state nominee." Todd J. Gillman, 
Filibuster Has Everyone Talking, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 1 1,2003, at A7. 
74. Todd J. Gillman, COP Senators Go I-for-2 on Judges; As Democrats Continue to Block Owen, Another 
Nominee is Conjrmed, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 2,2003, at 11A. 
75. James Politi, Democrats Set to Block Bush Nominee, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), May 1,2003, at 8; David L. 
Greene, Partisanship Reigns in Battle Over Courts, BALT. SUN, June 15, 2003, at 1C; Amy Goldstein & Helen 
Dewar, President Criticizes Filibusters, WASH. POST, May 10,2003, at A6. 
76. Janet Hook, Bush Vows to Fight On for Estrada, CHI. TFUB., Mar. 7,2003, at C14; James Gordon Meek, 
Bush Rips Dems for Judge-Vote Block, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 27,2003, at 19. 
77. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Stakes Are High In Estrada Filibuster, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 14,2003, at N I. 
78. Adam Cohen, For Partisan Gain. Republicans Decide Rules Were Meant to Be Broken, N.Y. TIMES, May 
27,2003, at A24. 
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The Estrada imbroglio was only one episode in an increasingly divisive 
process of federal judicial selection, as President Bush has nominated and 
re-n~minated'~ judicial candidates guaranteed to produce controversy and 
extraordinary "political" reaction by opposition Senators, who have one eye on 
the make-up of the federal judiciary and the other on the same electoral political 
process they believe is driving President Bush's nominations. It has not been a 
process likely to suggest that judges are expected to play a different role in our 
system from politicians elected for their particular agenda. 
History is clear. It does not even suggest that ideology is not or should not be 
an important consideration for both President and Senators. The Supreme Court 
appointment process is not one of Presidential dominance and Senatorial deferral. 
Although for a while in the nineteenth century party affiliation was a proxy for 
ideology, ideology has always been an issue. Since nominees started appearing 
before the Senate, a third have been rejected or withdrawn and ideology has been 
front and center as a consideration, in most cases, explicitly. 
B. JUDICIAL ETHICS DO NOT SPEAK TO THE ISSUE 
Judicial ethics provide no more imperative than history for Professor 
Rotunda's conclusion that Senators should not inquire about or consider a 
nominee's ideology. The Canon of Judicial Ethics on which he relies - 
5A(3)(d)(i) - neither mentions nor is aimed at ideology: 
(3) A candidate for judicial office (d) shall not (i) make pledges or promises of 
conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties 
of the office." 
From this Canon about making promises concerning conduct in office, Professor 
Rotunda claims "[ilt is wrong for a nominee to promise to vote a certain way, to 
promise (or appear to promise) to vote to overrule or to not overrule a particular 
precedent, or promise to approach a legal problem with a particular mind set."" 
I have no quarrel with the observation that it would be fruitless or harmful to ask 
nominees questions they are ethically prohibited from answering, but the cited 
Canon talks neither about "mind set" and how a judge might "approach a legal 
problem" nor about "appear to promise." Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii), by contrast, says a 
candidate shall not "make statements that commit or appear to commit the 
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come 
79. Judge Charles Pickering of the District Court in Mississippi was rejected by a Democratic controlled 
Senate. After the 2002 election, in which the Republicans took control of the Senate, President Bush 
re-nominated Pickering. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Bush Lashes Democrats on Judicial Filibusters, CHI. TRIB., 
May 10,2003, at 10; Joan Biskupic, Bush Unwavering Push for Conservative Bench, USATODAY, May 8,2003, 
at 2A. 
80. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (1990) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. 
8 1 .  ROTUNDA, supra note 45, at 133 (emphasis added). 
Heinonline 17 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 187 20032004 
[Vol. 17:175 
before the court"82 but it is specifically aimed at statements about cases, not 
statements about judicial philosophy. 
Professor Rotunda apparently finds his ethical argument in a combination of 
the two parts of the Canon - though he does not articulate that - and a melding of 
ideology with decisions in specific cases. He makes his case by inveighing 
against questions that ask how a nominee "would vote on particular legal 
questions."83 He uses as an example a question United Families of America 
proposed a Senator ask now-Justice Ginsburg at her 1980 confirmation hearing to 
sit on the D.C. Circuit: "Can the Congress limit the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts in, say, school busing cases?'He applauds Senator Howard Metzenbaum's 
reason for refusing to ask the question: "You don't mean that every nominee up 
for confirmation ought to have his or her views explored . . . on all of the 
7 ~ 8 4  controversial issues . . . . 
Whatever might be the prudential answer to Senator Metzenbaum's rhetorical 
question, nothing in Canon 5 would have prohibited then lawyer Ginsburg from 
answering the proposed separation of powers question. At least for the reach of an 
ethical prohibition, a question that asks how a nominee would decide a particular 
case is not the same as a question that asks about the nominee's approach to 
constitutional interpretation generally, or in a specific area. "Would you vote to 
uphold a state statute that prohibits abortion at any time beyond one week from 
conception?'for example, is a world apart from, "Do you consider privacy to be 
a fundamental right within the liberty guarantee of the 14th amendment?'The 
answer to the second question might provide an insight into how the nominee 
would approach answering the first, but that hardly makes it unethical for the 
nominee to answer the question, or unwise for the Senator to ask it. This is 
nothing more than recognition of the important difference between "particular 
mind set" or "approach," on the one hand, and "vote to overrule or to not overrule 
a particular precedent case" on the other. The American Bar Association's 
disapproval of testing a nominee's "particular political or ideological philoso- 
phies,"85 which Professor Rotunda cites in support of his conclusion, adds little. 
Neither the ABA's "ideological philosophies" tautology nor a prudential argu- 
ment about what Senators should ask amounts to an ethical proscription. Nothing 
in the Canon of Judicial Ethics prohibits a nominee from answering questions 
about the nominee's political or judicial ideology, philosophy of constitutional 
interpretation, or general views about the structure and interpretation of the 
Constitution. 
Professor Rotunda seems to concede that there is no real ethical proscription to 
answering questions about ideology. He finds his ethical bar by resort to the 
82. MODEL CODE Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1 990) (emphasis added). 
83. ROTUNDA, supra note 45, at 13 1 .  
84. Id. at 129. 
85. Id. at 141 11.63. 
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slippery-slope argument that if ideology questions are answered, particular case 
questions, which he considers beyond the ethical pale, will follow: "if those 
questions [that probe his or her views of what the law is or should be] are fair 
game, others [that inquire about deciding particular cases] are as Senator 
Schumer's recitation of the questions he would ask a nominee - some about 
constitutional interpretation and some about future cases - lends some support to 
the slippery-slope fear, but whatever caution it might raise for the wisdom of 
making ideology fair game in the confirmation process, it does nothing to create 
an ethical problem. Questions about ideology - be they about the proper role for 
the court, the proper approach to determining fundamental rights, or the breadth 
of the first amendment's coverage - are of a different order than questions about 
issues de jour - be they slavery, separate but equal, New Deal legislation, or 
ab~r t ion.~ '  There is a critical ethical difference between promising to "overrule or 
not to overrule a particular precedent" and explaining "the particular mind set" 
with which the nominee might "approach a legal problem." The former is 
something no prospective justice should indulge. The latter is something no 
prospective justice should be without. 
IV. IDEOLOGY, ES; AGENDA, NO. 
It does not follow, of course, that because neither history nor ethics prohibit the 
President and the Senate from considering ideology in the Supreme Court 
appointment process that it would be prudent for them to do so. Indeed, it would 
probably be best for the public perception of the Court if we could go back to the 
days before 1968 when the selection of Supreme Court Justices was not on the 
public radar screen and party affiliation was more important in the process than 
ideology. It would probably be better, also, to go back to the days before humans 
had nuclear weapons, but both nuclear weapons and the importance of ideology 
for the Supreme Court appointment process are here to stay. The perceived 
elective political stakes for the President and individual Senators are too high to 
ignore. Pressure will be intense from interest groups hoping to prove their worth 
by influencing appointment to the Court that "really" counts.88 The electronic 
media, running out of wars, murders, and the "winner" of the latest "reality" TV 
show8' needs desperately to fill their 2417, wall-to-wall, "entertainews" approach 
to each month's "story of the ~entury."'~ 
86. Id. at 133. 
87. It is true that during his July 1 ,  2001 appearance on the NBC television show, Meet the Press, Senator 
Schumer overlooked the important difference between specific issues and ideology. Id. at 128; see also infra 
text accompanying note 110. 
88. Shogan, supra note 70, at 137. 
89. The progress on "Joe Millionaire," an ABC "reality" show, "American Idol," a Fox talent search of sons, 
- - 
and "Survivor," a CBS "reality" contest has been a regular part of both morning and evening news casts. 
90. BILL KOVACH & TOM R O S E N ~ ,  WARP SPEED: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF MIXED MEDIA CULTURE 4 (1999). 
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The question is whether there is any way to avoid damaging the neutral arbiter 
myth that supports the Court's authority in the face of a bare-knuckled political 
battle over how a new Supreme Court Justice is likely to view Roe v. Wade, 
affirmative action, school prayer, school vouchers, homosexuality, flag burning, 
or any of the other issues deemed at stake in the "culture wars." 
Critics of a Court that is "half judicial tribunal and half political preceptor" will 
answer the question by arguing that the simple way for the Court to maintain 
public perception that it is "an impartial, judicious tribunal" has nothing to do 
with judicial selection and everything to do with the court avoiding injudicious 
decisions by minding its proper place as the critics define it. 
The initial problem with that answer, of course, is that injudiciousness, like 
beauty, is "in the eye of the beh~lder."~'  Despite Cassandra-like predictions from 
the losers of "injudicious" decisions, no single opinion or a group of opinions to 
date has destroyed the myth of the neutral arbiter. Except for short bursts from 
small groups, there is no evidence that any opinions have brought the Court into 
the kind of long-term public disrespect that would jeopardize the apparent 
approving consensus of the American people and the Court's resulting place of 
influence in our constitutional republican democracy. 
The second problem with looking to avoidance of injudicious decisions is 
prediction. The Justices have some ability, by attention to reticence, to sidestep 
when litigants bring questions to the Court that the elective political process 
cannot decide, has avoided for so long it has lost its claim of right to decide, or 
has decided in a way antithetical to the society's core values. Leaving to others 
the argument over the propriety of a judicial sidestep, judicial prescience and 
political history rarely match. With the exception of the endless cultural struggle 
to "fix" America's greatest mistake and its ripples - black slavery (Dred Scott v. 
 anf for&^), segregation (Plessy v. ~ e r ~ u s o n ~ ~ ) ,  desegregation, (Brown v. Board of 
  ducat ion^^), political exclusion (Baker v. carrg5), and affirmative action (Bakke 
v. Regents 96) - most of the enduring cultural-political questions with which the 
Court has been involved were neither "enduring," nor was the decision 
predictably dangerous to long-term public respect for the Court. 
The dispute over the national bank, the cases hindering and then implementing 
the New Deal, the criminal procedure revolution, and the relatively recent 
infusion of power into the First Amendment represent significant issues of the 
day in which the Court played a role. Looking back from 2003 at those decisions, 
91. The idea about beauty being more about the person of the opinion than the object viewed has many 
literary references. "Beauty is in the eye of the beholder" is from Margaret Wolfe Hungerford's Molly Brawn. 
92. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
93. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
94. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
95. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
96. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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one might argue that by intervening, the Court furthered public perception that it 
acted as "an impartial, judicious tribunal." Even the still raging, quarter-century 
political storm over Roe v. Wade was not clear to the 1973 observer of the public 
dialogue, let alone a cloistered Supreme Court Justice. In 1973, prohibiting 
abortion was not any politician's idea of a good election issue. Abortion had not 
been prohibited in America for most of the nineteenth century. It became banned 
in almost every state during the Victorian era, but by 1973, twenty states had 
repealed their abortion bans97 and the mainstream medical, legal, and public 
health associations argued for the result in ~ o e . ~ '  
Even if the Court has provided grist for the mill of critics on the left and right 
when they were dissatisfied with the decisions, the message the President and 
Senate send through their conduct of the appointment process is likely to have a 
greater influence on the public's perception of the Court than any particular 
decision or group of decisions. If they treat the appointment process as just 
another political battleground it will have more negative effect on public 
perception than anything nominees are likely to do while on the Court. 
There is a superficial attractiveness to the idea that if the President and Senate 
do not consider ideology in the nomination-confirmation process there will be no 
risk that the process will politicize the Court. But the idea that ideology should 
not be an important part in the consideration of Supreme Court nominees flies in 
the face of both reality and prudence. 
Reality. Reasons other than ideology have been articulated for twentieth 
century Senate rejections, but as more than one commentator has suggested, 
"these issues were employed in large part to mask ideological opp~s i t i on . "~~  
Since 1968 - the entire time of political awareness for more than three-quarters of 
the electorate - Presidents and Senates have been locked in a kind of Prisoner's 
Dilemma over ideology that shows no sign of abating. And even if a President 
and Senate agreed not to consider ideology, or conspired to consider it, butto take 
the appearance out of the process, they would be unlikely to succeed. Neither the 
interest groups nor the media would suffer the silence. 
Prudence. More importantly, ideology should be a central part of the 
nomination-confirmation process. The President and Senators are not doing their 
jobs if they do not pay some attention to a nominee's approach to the law, to the 
Constitution, to the society, and to life in general. Observers from as diverse 
perspectives as Chief Justice Rehnquist and Professor Laurence Tribe have 
argued that ideology is at the center of the nomination-confirmation process. The 
Chief Justice suggests that a President who does not consider ideology in 
97. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140 (1973). 
98. Id. at 133-34. 
99. JOHN MASSARO, SUPREMELY POLITICAL: THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY AND PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT IN 
UNSUCCE~~NL SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS 109 (1990). 
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nominating has not given the Court the attention it desewes.lo0 Professor Tribe 
argues that a Senate that does not consider ideology in confirming has not 
performed its constitutionally mandated check and balance function.I0' It seems 
silly to suggest that a nominee for the Court should come with no ideology. Then 
Justice Rehnquist put it well when he said, 
It would be not merely unusual, but extraordinary, if [Supreme Court 
nominees] had not at least given opinions as to constitutional issues in their 
previous legal careers. Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the 
Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication 
would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.''' 
Ideology, however, is different from agenda. The ideology important for a 
Supreme Court Justice is that relating to the Court's proper role in the American 
scheme of government, the nominee's general philosophy about Supreme Court 
decision-making, and the nominee's mode of approaching issues of constitutional 
interpretation. That bundle of ideas, which might be characterized as judicial 
philosophy, is very different from a nominee having a political or judicial agenda. 
A political agenda is the approach we associate with political campaigns - the 
platform, the specific policy goals for which the candidate hopes to either muster 
or reflect popular choice. In the context of Supreme Court appointments, this 
agenda is about how a nominee expects to vote on future cases or views past 
precedents. A judicial agenda (more closely related to judicial philosophy) is a 
matter of emphasis. In the context of Supreme Court appointments, agenda 
signifies a greater interest in pressing an ideology than in deciding cases. 
The difference between ideology and agenda is critical. A nominee with an 
ideology can be expected to be injluenced by it. A nominee with an agenda can be 
expected to be driven by it. In the difference between ideology and agenda, 
judici4 independence is at stake. It is not the judicial independence of the 
particular nominee from promises made - the most ardent promise (should any 
nominee ever be foolish enough to provide it) is virtually impossible to enforce 
against a life-tenured jurist with salary protection - but the judiciary's indepen- 
dence from will, be it popular or within the heart of the Justices. 
The genius of our constitutional system - or at least the political history lesson 
from a successful democracy - is that the Supreme Court presents a limiting, 
leavening, and long-term policy perspective on short-term popular will. If the 
Supreme Court is staffed to accommodate popular will, or if the President, 
Senate, and public believe it should reflect popular will, its limiting function will 
be stripped from the "nice balance." The "nice balance," of course, requires that 
judicial independence from popular will not become judicial supremacy over 
100. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 209 (2001). 
101. LAURENCE H.TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT ch. 6 (1985). 
102. Laird v. Taturn, 409 U.S. 824,835 (1972). 
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popular will - a caution as old as the republic. Alexander Hamilton, the originator 
3,103 of the idea that the judiciary was the "least dangerous branch of government, 
believed the answer was in governmental structure. The executive had the sword, 
the legislature had the purse, the judges were appointed by the elected President 
and Senate, and the judge's tenure was at the mercy of the legislature's opinion of 
the judge's good behavior. Good behavior, for Hamilton, meant the judges' duty 
to "declare the sense of the law."'04 In addition to charging the two elected 
branches of the government with staffing the Court and overseeing the propriety 
of the conduct of the Justices, the Constitution, also, provided structural checks. 
It left the number of Justices to the legislature and amendment of the Constitution 
to the people. 
As it turned out, however, only one of the structural checks on judicial 
supremacy has proven to be more than theoretical. The "good behavior" check 
was exercised for the first and last time in 1805. The Jeffersonian Republicans 
impeached the Federalist Associate Justice Samuel Chase on grounds clearly related to 
politics of the day, but his acquittal by a Republican controlled Senate marked the last 
attempt to impeach and convict a sitting Justice. Changing the number of Justices on the 
Court was an occasionally effective method for the Senate to alter the Court to conform 
to popular will,'05 until a Democratic controlled Congress emphatically rejected 
President Franklin Roosevelt's 1937 plan to reduce the influence of the anti-new deal 
,9106 
"four horseman by increasing the number of Justices on the Court. Since 
then, "court packing" to achieve a current political objective has been a 
universally understood pejorative. Constitutional amendments to reverse Su- 
preme Court decisions have been only slightly more successful. Of the many 
such amendments offered, only the Sixteenth Amendment, providing for a 
national income tax, made its way into the Constitution. 
The one effective structural check on judicial supremacy is the joint 
responsibility of the two elected branches of the government to staff the Court. If 
the President and the Senate are to exercise a meaningful popular will check on 
judicial supremacy, they must do it with the long-range view that mirrors the life 
tenure of the Justices and the Court's long-range influence and not the short-range 
view that reflects the currents of political positions. 
103. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
104. Id. ("The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL 
instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the 
legislative body."). 
105. GERHARDT, supra note 41, at 154-55. The First Congress' number of six Justices was reduced to five by 
the Federalists fearing a Jefferson appointment and restored to six when the Jeffersonians took control of the 
Congress. During the argument about a national bank, the Senate denied President Jackson's nomination of 
Roger Taney by abolishing the seat. When Jacksonians controlled the Congress, the Court was expanded to 
nine, enhancing President Jackson's influence. A radical Republican Congress reduced the size of the Court to 
thwart President Andrew Johnson and restored the seats when Johnson left office. Id. 
106. Associate Justices Pierce Butler, James C. McReynolds, George Sutherland, and Willis Van Devanter. Id. 
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The President and Senate can exercise a meaningful influence on the Court's 
role in shaping society by paying express attention to how prospective Justices 
view the Court's role, how they approach constitutional analysis, and how they 
understand various constitutional provisions. If the President and the Senate are 
serious about their duty, there is a formula that is simple to follow, but politically 
difficult to accept. It emphasizes their obligations as public servants at the 
possible cost of a lost opportunity to score current political points: (1) Inquire 
about long-term Court issues, rather than hot button issues of the day. (2) Search 
for individuals with a well thought-out judicial philosophy who can ensure that 
no single philosophy dominates the Court. (3) Keep ideologues of any stripe off 
the Court by looking for individuals whose respect for the Court's historic role is 
greater than their adherence to any particular ideology. 
The first step, as with most journeys, is the most difficult. Neither the President 
nor the Senators should seek a nominee's views on the political questions of the 
day, or ask about how particular cases should be or have been decided. This is the 
most difficult step because these are the questions with which the interest groups 
and the media are obsessed, and interest groups and the media are the things with 
which politicians are obsessed. Interest groups and the media are properly 
interested in resolution of current hot button issues; they are the grist for the 
political mill of election campaigns; they are what popular sovereignty is all 
about. The President and the Senators are properly interested in those issues as 
campaigners and when passing and enforcing legislation. But they have other 
obligations, as well. Their unique opportunity to choose the members of the other 
branch of government is such an obligation. To put it bluntly, their obligation to 
provide the country with a Court that will have the proper view of its place and of 
the Constitution is more important than finding a Justice who will vote the "right" 
way on abortion - whatever that right way is - or the "right" way on whatever 
will be the hot button issue of 2020. 
Roe v. Wade is this era's national bank controversy, New Deal struggle, and 
breakdown of segregation. It does not achieve its status because a majority of the 
populace is interested in reversing a woman's right to terminate a pregnan~y,'~' 
but because it is the signature for a wider social issue - the extent to which the 
elected government, reflecting its view of the social, moral, religious views of the 
majority, can impose those views on the entire society. Unlike the hot button 
issues of earlier eras that related to societal structure (including the issue of 
slavery), the "privacy" issues deal exclusively with cultural texture. The 1980 
Republican platform's family values plank was about Roe. President Reagan's 
nominees were allegedly required to pass a Roe litmus test. Senator Joseph 
107. Karlyn Bowman, Gallup News Service, Abortion Attitudes Today, (Jan. 2000). at http:Nwww.gallup.coml 
polllguest-scholar/gs000112.asp (July 18,2003). 
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Biden, an important Democratic member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
announced that his vote depended upon a nominee's view of ~ 0 e . I ' ~  When 
vacancies on the Court seemed imminent in 2003, the interests groups from one 
side of the divide and the other focused on Roe as the sine qua non of 
qualification. The President and many Senators will be sorely tempted to give 
great, if not determinative, weight to the next nominees' views of Roe. It will play 
to - maybe be demanded by - their core constituencies. In a democracy in which 
less than half the eligible voters regularly bother to cast a ballot, intensity of 
interest is a more valuable political coin than any opinion poll majority. 
If the President and the Senators are more interested in the long-term future of 
the nation than in their own temporary political gain, they will resist the 
temptation to ask or talk about Roe or any other of the hot button issues of the 
culture wars. Those issues put the wrong focus on the process. In a political 
version of Gresham's Law, "bad questions drive out At least since the 
Federalists and the Republicans were intensely interested in the best structure for 
their new government, the popular hot button issues of the day have been of 
greater interest and reportage (and more likely to gain the questioner political 
capital) than abstract questions about the role of the Court, the theory of 
constitutional analysis, and the meaning of portions of the Constitution. If focus 
on the "bad" questions is allowed to "drive out the good," there will be at least 
three unfortunate consequences: (1) Decision-makers who care about the 
nominee's influence on the long-term future of the Court will not gain the 
information they need. (2) Decision-makers, the public, and, in time, the potential 
Justices themselves, will begin to believe that only the popular questions matter 
in choosing a nominee, changing the Court, permanently, from an oracle for the 
law to an orifice for popular choice - something of which our government already 
has at least two. (3) The quality of the jurist that will emerge from a Roe driven 
process is likely to be less than we need. 
Thirty years after Roe, a nominee with a firm view about whether it should be 
overruled, is unlikely to be a good Justice. Whatever the nominee's view about 
the propriety of the constitutional analysis in Roe, the Court has been reticent to 
overturn a precedent of its age and social interest, doing so only in the rare 
instance where a different societal reality demands it. A nominee who knows 
enough to resolve those issues without being in the crucible where the vote 
counts, might know enough to be a legislator, but knows too little to sit on the 
Court. 
It is important that the nomination and confirmation process not focus on how 
a nominee would decide a hypothetical case or rule on a particular precedent. It is 
equally important that the ideology, "philosophy of constitutional interpretation," 
108. GERHARDT, supra note 4 1, at 3 13. 
109. "Bad money drives out g o o d  is attributed to Sir Thomas Gresham (1519-1579) a financial advisor to 
Queen Elizabeth I of England. 5 NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 489 (2002). 
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"particular mind set" or whatever one call's the perspective from which a 
nominee will "approach a legal problem," become a major factor in assessing a 
nominee's suitability. Questions about ideology will help to illuminate a 
nominee's views about the long-term issues that matter for the Court's place in 
our societal structure. While there may be no necessary correlation between 
methods of constitutional interpretation and views of the Court's role in society, 
the existence of a continuum from the pure textualist, who believes that 
everything that matters is in the Constitution, to the pure non-interpretivist, who 
believes that the Constitution is a starting place at best, is proof that ideology is 
critical to the functioning of an institution that decides societal issues of current 
importance by reference to a relatively short, two centuries-plus-old document 
full of general phrases. "We are all interpretivists; the real arguments are not over 
whether judges should stick to interpreting, but over what they should interpret 
and what interpretive attitudes they should adopt.""' In addition to focusing on 
more relevant issues, exploration of ideology will make the selection process 
more transparent, more informative, and more honest. As a possible bonus, 
attention to a nominee's ideology might overshadow the focus of the various 
interest groups on how the nominee would decide a particular case or the 
obsession of the media with whether the nominee is among the majority of the 
nominee's generation who once smoked a joint."' The latter is no small matter. 
The increasing popularity of smear politics, fueled by media fascination with the 
personal and the sensational, has created a world in which Caesar's wife might 
have second thoughts about public life. Attention to ideology, with its implica- 
tions for the direction of the Court, might push the personal garbage beyond the 
public dialogue and public interest. 
In extolling the advantage of inquiry about ideology, it is only fair to 
acknowledge the problem of execution. Aside from the likelihood that such an 
inquiry will score no political points for the questioner, ideology or philosophy 
about the Constitution, the Court, and its work is not, generally, what Presidents 
and Senators know. And slipping from the general philosophy to the particular 
hypothetical is easy to do if one is not careful. Consider Senator Schumer's 
proposed First Amendment questions: "What's your views on the First Amend- 
ment? How broad, how narrow? . . . Well, how does that stack up in terms of 
campaign finance reform? Would you vote to knock out much of campaign 
finance r e f ~ r m ? " ' ~  Leaving aside whether the questions are fashioned so that 
110. Professor Thomas C. Grey, who coined "interpretivist" and "non-interpretivist" eventually disagreed 
with himself. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT E  AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPEC'IIVES 65-66 (2d 
ed. 2000) (citing Thomas Grey, The Constitution as  Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984)). 
1 1  1 .  President Ronald Reagan withdrew Douglas Ginsburg's nomination after he was accused of smoking 
pot sometime in his past. For a withering critique of the role of interest groups and the media in the judicial 
selection process, see CARTER, supra note 7. 
112. ROTUNDA, supra note 45, at 128 (reporting Senator Schumer's comments on NBC's telecast of Meet the 
Press on July 1,2001). 
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they fairly could be answered without more definition, they cover a continuum 
from the most general view about the sweep of the First Amendment to the most 
specific about how the nominee might vote on the constitutionality of an 
unspecified portion of the campaign-finance reform act. Questioning about 
ideology will not be easy. Senators will have to learn something new, depend 
heavily on staff, consult with theorists who can identify the issues, and work with 
lawyers who can frame a simple question designed to evoke a complex answer. 
Asking about ideology begs the question: What should be done with the 
answer? An obvious response is that the popular sovereignty check on judicial 
supremacy suggests leaving it to the political process. A President should not 
nominate and the Senate should not confirm someone whose ideology is not 
acceptable. If the President and the Senate have different ideas of "acceptable," 
the normal political process of compromise will sort it all out. Even if the process 
is messy, at least it will be messy about the right issues. A less obvious and 
undoubtedly less likely response is that successful compromise between majority 
and minority views is the essence of an enduring democracy. The President and 
the Senators, in pursuit of their joint obligation, should endeavor to maintain 
various judicial philosophies on a Court that helps to shape the democracy. 
Conceding that such an unselfish view has not prevailed since the Federalists 
tried to hijack the judiciary in 1801, the advantage of this less likely response is 
that it sends the message to all concerned that the Court is not a political prize to 
be captured. 
Inquiry into ide$ogy and insistence on answers, in addition to identifying 
relevant considerations and helping to take the focus from political issues of the 
day, might help identify the nominee whose political or judicial agenda is not 
obvious from past statements or actions. The Bork experience cautions nominees 
not to be forthcoming about their ideology. That, unfortunately, is the wrong 
lesson. Whether Robert Bork should have a seat on the Court aside, it probably 
was not his ideology -his philosophy about either the Court or the Constitution - 
that defeated his candidacy. President Reagan's delay in coming to his defense, ' I 3  
Democratic political payback,''4 Bork's infamous firing of Watergate Special 
Prosecutor Archibald  COX,"^ his "confirmation conversion" from previously 
stated positions,"6 or some combination of all of them are at least as likely. As 
Professor Carter has observed, Bork "had much to answer for.""' But the real 
problem for Judge Bork was that he was perceived as someone whose ideology 
was a crusade. The problem was not with what he believed, but how fervently he 
113. GERHARDT, supra note 41, at 83. 
114. Id. at 85. 
115. Id.at 163. 
1 16. Id. at 197. 
1 1  7. CARTER, supra note 7, at 48. 
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believed it and how often he expressed it. In politicking for the posi t i~n,"~ he
provided ammunition for his opponents, but most importantly to the outcome, he 
painted himself as a man with an agenda. While Senator Ted Kennedy's "Robert 
Bork's America" speech may have been "a patent fit of gross hyperbo~e,""~ it
succeeded at least in part because Robert Bork's agenda made the hyperbole 
plausible to many. 
The obvious tactical lesson for nominees from the Bork experience is that 
being viewed as an ideologue - someone with either a political or a judicial 
agenda - will get you in trouble. There is a lesson for Presidents and Senators as 
well. Ideology matters. Lost in the revulsion about the worst parts of the Bork 
experience is that the discussion about judicial philosophy was useful in 
assessing whether Robert Bork had an ideology or the ideology had him. 
Presidents choosing nominees and Senators confirming them should ask about 
ideology, should insist on answers, and should listen carefully to the content and 
the tone of the nominee's responses. No nominee should be allowed to hide 
behind the spurious claim that answers would be unethical. A nominee who 
claims to have no opinions is either not being forthcoming or is not qualified. 
Someone who is one nomination and confirmation away from a seat on the 
Supreme Court and cannot express an opinion about the role of the Supreme 
Court, how the Constitution should be interpreted, and what various parts of the 
Constitution mean should be rejected for insufficient intellectual fortitude. 
Hamlet would not have made a good Justice. By the same token, overwhelming 
certainty about the propriety of one's ideology is the mark of a nominee too 
certain to be a judge. 
Agenda, as I have used it, is an amalgam of qualities that suggest an advocate, 
rather than a decision-maker - legislative character rather than judicial character. 
While no person is all one or all the other, one does not have much difficulty, at 
least in retrospect, in differentiating between the second Justice John Marshall 
Harlan and Justice Antonin Scalia. Both fit many people's definition of 
conservative, but while Justice Harlan appeared to be a decision-maker with a 
vision, Justice Scalia appears to be a visionary pursuing particular decisions - a 
Justice with an agenda. 
Professor Stephen Carter has said, "The issue, finally, is not what sort of theory 
the nominee happens to indulge but what sort of person the nominee happens to 
9,120 be. In a more expansive suggestion about testing character, Professor Ronald 
Dworkin urges inquiry into the general political and social views of nominees, 
because no Justice can insulate "his decision from his own most basic convictions 
about political fairness and social justice. " I 2 '  Professor Gerhardt, however, 
118. GERHARDT, supra note 41, at 196. 
119. ABRAHAM, supra note 52, at 298. 
120. CARTER, supra note 7, at 15 1. 
12 1. RONALD WORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 3 13 ( 1996). 
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womes that "focus on the nominee's moral character is bound to make judicial 
confirmations much messier . . . bound to turn on perceptions or even on 
swearing contests between conflicting witnesses about private conduct with 
arguably public implications. ,7122 
Understanding the nominee's judicial character strikes me as the most 
important aspect of the nominee's qualifications - worth the extra mess, if 
necessary. The extra mess, however, should be avoidable. Judicial character is not 
exactly "good character" in the general sense. Even a charge of sexual 
harassment, though it raises questions about personal relationships and sensibili- 
ties, seems to have less to do with judicial competence than qualities like honesty, 
open-mindedness, patience, intellectual curiosity, and interest in the opinion of 
others, to mention a few. Those who believe that Justice Clarence Thomas is less 
then they would like in a Supreme Court Justice complain about what they 
perceive as flaws in his judicial character (or about how he votes) long after the 
"he-said, she-said" has faded. 
Judicial character, whatever else it entails, suggests a person with sufficient 
hesitation, as a matter of character, so that decisions await controversies. Judicial 
character also values the tradition of the Court. Tradition is the real governor 
maintaining the Court as "half judicial tribunal and half political preceptor." 
While the Court's inability to interpret the Constitution without a case and 
controversy is a structural restraint on judicial supremacy, it is what Professor 
,7123 McCloskey called the "'courtly' attributes that keeps the Court in its place. 
The Court does not give advisory opinions, has exercised (mostly) consistent 
discretion not to venture into certain areas of constitutional consideration, and 
usually considers itself bound by its precedents. Both the rarity and the relative 
longevity of the Court's policy-making are due to the Court's adherence to the 
law's tradition. The structure and rules of legal analysis, the notion of stare 
decisis, and the constitutional tradition that policy is the province of the 
majoritarian governmental institutions, unless they act or fail to act in a way that 
offends the core values of the society, inhibit the half of the Court that is "political 
preceptor." 
Agenda is the enemy of tradition. The two eternal questions for the Court 
are when to exercise its power to identify core values and when to change its 
mind about core values. Justices with agendas are too eager to answer those 
questions too quickly. A nominee who does not have a view about how the 
Constitution should be interpreted, about what should be the role of the 
Supreme Court and about what various parts of the Constitution mean has no 
ideology and is not qualified for the important work of a Supreme Court 
Justice. A nominee whose reasons for coming to the Court are to influence 
122. GERHARDT, supra note 4 1, at 3 15. 
123. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 9, at 12. 
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future decisions in accord with the nominee's views about political questions 
of the day, correct what the nominee views as past mistakes of the Court, or 
change the way the Court operates has an agenda, is an ideologue, and is not 
qualified for the important work of a Supreme Court Justice. People who have 
strong political positions about legal issues are poor choices for the bench, 
not because they are bad people, but because they do not have the judicial 
character. 
It will be difficult to establish the norm that politicians should not appear to 
politicize the Supreme Court. The Court's moderating, counter-majoritarian 
function has been so important to our history that responsible politicians must do 
what it takes to preserve it. Some semblance of reason in the process will develop 
if Presidents and Senators realize that ideology on its own normally should 
almost never disqualify a candidate, while agenda should always. The realization 
depends as much on a positive view about ideology as it does on a negative view 
of agenda. Instead of pretending that ideology does not matter, Presidents and 
Senators should acknowledge that there are varying respectable views about the 
Court and the Constitution, that it is important to know a nominee's views, and 
that those views are not disqualifying unless they are beyond the pale or held with 
such ferocity that they will override all other considerations. There will, of 
course, be differences of opinion as to what is too ferocious and as to where the 
pale ends, but politics, government, and society are about conflicting views. One 
can only ask for good faith, and then vote in the next election against politicians 
who refuse to exercise it. 
Acceptance of the place for ideology and rejection of any place for agenda will 
diminish the worst parts of the appointment process and will stop the Court from 
spinning out of its traditional place and into the elective political maelstrom. If 
ideology in a reasonable nominee were not a basis for challenge, President 
George W. Bush might not feel compelled to nominate an ideologue who writes 
that "the wife is to subordinate herself to her husband and that the woman is to 
9 ,124  place herself under the authority of the man, or one who in a political speech 
characterizes Roe as "the worst abomination of constitutional law in our history" 
,9125 and pray for "Please, God, no more Souters. If agenda were an automatic 
disqualifier, Democratic Senators might not feel compelled to reject for the 
appellate court an apparently fair-minded district court judge unlucky enough to 
124. Jennifer Lee, Attack on Judicial Nominee Leads Panel to Delay Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Friday, Apr. 11,2003, 
at A22 (discussing district court nominee Dr. James Leon Holmes, a former President of Arkansas Right to 
Life). 
125. Editorial, Unjt to Judge, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2003, at A26 (discussing appellate court nominee 
William Pryor, Attorney General of Alabama and outspoken culture wars warrior). 
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be sponsored by a Senator who made public statements taken to be racist'26 or 
oppose a well-qualified, well-respected constitutional law scholar because of his 
scholarship. l Z 7  
Interest groups on the "right" and the "left" are raising money and gearing up 
for a political campaign about abortion, affirmative action, school prayer, and 
other specific culture war issues. It is unlikely that the groups on either side of the 
divide represent anything near a majority of Americans,lZ8 yet they are driving 
the federal judiciary appointment process and are bidding fair to drive the coming 
Supreme Court appointments. The First Amendment and our understanding of an 
open and democratic society suggest that there is little more important than their 
right to political speech. But that does not mean that the President and the Senate 
need to listen when they speak to the wrong issues. It is a given that a 
consequence of free speech is that there will be nonsense and falsehood in the 
public dialogue. The system works when the listeners - in this case the President 
and the Senate - know how to separate the good from the bad, the fair from the 
unfair, the right from the wrong. When it comes to the Supreme Court, ideology 
is inevitable; agenda is intolerable. 
126. Judge Charles Pickering, a district court judge in Mississippi, was a controversial appointment whose 
rejection by the Senate Judiciary Committee when Democrats controlled the Senate was due more to the 
foot-in-mouth disease of minority leader Senator Trent Lott than to any suggestion that Pickering was a judge 
with an agenda - a charge that was made against another rejected nominee, Judge Patricia Owens. Nick 
Anderson, Battle Over Judiciary Enters New Phase: As Democrats Prepare to Fight Bush Choice, Other 
Notninees Move Toward Approval, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2003, at A16 ("Democrats attacked Owens as a 
conservative 'judicial activist.' "). 
127. Judge Michael McConnell, a respected law professor, former Supreme Court clerk to Justice William 
Brennan, and advocate of the Court's traditions was confirmed only after heated objection based not upon his 
judicial ideology, but upon what liberal interest groups feared might be his positions on Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973) and on Bob Jones Universiry v. UnitedStates, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) -cases he would be in no position 
to overrule as a circuit court judge. 
128. See generally GERHARDT, supra note 41, at 69-72. Public choice theorists, contending that narrow 
interest groups have more influence on legislators than larger groups with diffuse interests, have put a scholarly 
mantel on the old political wisdom that intensity is more important than numbers. Id. 
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